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WARFARE IS ONLY AN INVENTION—NOT A BIOLOGICAL NECESSITY

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Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity

Instinctivist theories of human aggressiveness have been criticized, especially because such views seem to promote the notion that warfare is “in our genes” and, hence, cannot be prevented. There is, indeed, some evidence that people who are politically conservative and typically pro-military disproportionately tend to believe that human beings are “naturally” aggressive, untrustworthy, and incapable of changing. In any event, the prevailing view among social scientists is that there is no “war instinct,” even though aggressiveness may sometimes be readily evoked.

Anthropologists concern themselves largely with the activities of non-Western, typically nontechnological societies. There is legitimate debate about whether such study casts valuable light on modern, technological war-making. Some emphasize that the two situations are quite different, while others argue that examination of “primitive” war might help illuminate the conditions under which group violence has evolved. Some anthropologists, for example, claim that the capacity for warfare developed along with adaptations for hunting large game; others have emphasized competition for mates, for social prestige, or between rival bands.

A cross-cultural perspective on war reveals, among other things, a widespread tendency to dehumanize members of other tribes, often using literally animalizing terms to describe strangers and enemies. War-making is also typically associated with an array of rituals, with the enhancement of group cohesion, as well as with ritual purification connected with the taking of human life. A schism of sorts also exists among anthropologists, with some convinced that “primitive war” is functional (although not necessarily good) in meeting various ecological and social needs, while others claim that it is essentially dysfunctional, a social pathology.

In general, however, anthropologists have contributed less heavily to the study of war than might be expected. An exception is Margaret Mead, whose brief essay, reprinted below, has become a classic statement of the anti-instinctivist school.

From “Warfare is Only an Invention—not a Biological Necessity,” by Margaret Mead. 1940. Asia, XL: 402–5.
Is war a biological necessity, a sociological inevitability, or just a bad invention? Those who argue for the first view endow man with such pugnacious instincts that some outlet in aggressive behavior is necessary if man is to reach full human stature. A basic, competitive, aggressive, warring human nature is assumed, and those who wish to outlaw war or outlaw competitiveness merely try to find new and less socially destructive ways in which these biologically given aspects of man's nature can find expression. Then there are those who take the second view: warfare is the inevitable concomitant of the development of the state, the struggle for land and natural resources of class societies springing not from the nature of man, but from the nature of history. War is nevertheless inevitable unless we change our social system and outlaw classes, the struggle for power, and possessions; and in the event of our success warfare would disappear, as a symptom vanishes when the disease is cured.

One may hold a sort of compromise position between these two extremes; one may claim that all aggression springs from the frustration of man's biologically determined drives and that, since all forms of culture are frustrating, it is certain each new generation will be aggressive and the aggression will find its natural and inevitable expression in race war, class war, nationalistic war, and so on. All three of these positions are very popular today among those who think seriously about the problems of war and its possible prevention, but I wish to urge another point of view, less defeatist, perhaps, than the first and third and more accurate than the second: that is, that warfare, by which I mean recognized conflict between two groups as groups, in which each group puts an army (even if the army is only fifteen pygmies) into the field to fight and kill, if possible, some of the members of the army of the other group—that warfare of this sort is an invention like any other of the inventions in terms of which we order our lives, such as writing, marriage, cooking our food instead of eating it raw, trial by jury, or burial of the dead, and so on. Some of this list anyone will grant are inventions: trial by jury is confined to very limited portions of the globe; we know that there are tribes that do not bury their dead but instead expose or cremate them; and we know that only part of the human race has had the knowledge of writing as its cultural inheritance. But, whenever a way of doing things is found universally, such as the use of fire or the practice of some form of marriage, we tend to think at once that it is not an invention at all but an attribute of humanity itself. And yet even such universals as marriage and the use of fire are inventions like the rest, very basic ones, inventions which were, perhaps, necessary if human history was to take the turn that it has taken, but nevertheless inventions. At some point in his social development man was undoubtedly without the institution of marriage or the knowledge of the use of fire.

The case for warfare is much clearer because there are peoples even today who have no warfare. Of these the Eskimos are perhaps the most conspicuous examples, but the Lepchas of Sikkim described by Geoffrey Gorer in Himalayan Village are as good. Neither of these peoples understands war, not even defensive warfare. The idea of warfare is lacking, and this idea is as essential to really carrying on war as an alphabet or a syllabary is to writing. But, whereas the Lepchas are a gentle, unquarrelsome people, and the advocates of other points of view might argue that they are not full human beings or that they had never been frustrated and so had no aggression to expand in warfare, the Eskimo case gives no such possibility of interpretation. The Eskimos are not a mild and meek people; many of them are turbulent and troublesome. Fights, theft of wives, murder, cannibalism, occur among them—all outbursts of passionate men goaded by desire or intolerable circumstance. Here are men faced with hunger, men faced with loss of their wives, men faced with the threat of extermination by other men, and here are orphan children, growing up miserably with no one to care for them, mocked and neglected by those about them. The personality necessary for war, the circumstances necessary to goad men to desperation are present, but there is no war. When a traveling Eskimo entered a settlement, he might have to fight the strongest man in the settlement to establish his position among them, but this was a test of strength and bravery, not war. The idea of warfare, of one group organizing against another group to main and wound
and kill them was absent. And, without that
idea, passions might rage but there was no war.

But, it may be argued, is not this because
the Eskimos have so low a form and undeveloped
form of social organization? They own no
land, they move from place to place, camping,
it is true, season after season on the same site,
but this is not something to fight for as the
modern nations of the world fight for land
and raw materials. They have no permanent pos-
sessions that can be looted, no towns that can
be burned. They have no social classes to pro-
duce stress and strains within the society
which might force it to go to war outside. Does
not the absence of war among the Eskimos,
while disproving the biological necessity of
war, just go to confirm the point that it is the
state of development of the society which
accounts for war and nothing else?

We find the answer among the pygmy
peoples of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of
Bengal. The Andamans also represent an
exceedingly low level of society; they are a
hunting and food-gathering people; they live
in tiny hordes without any class stratification;
their houses are simpler than the snow houses
of the Eskimo. But they knew about warfare.
The army might contain only fifteen deter-
mind pygmies marching in a straight line, but
it was the real thing none the less. Tiny army
met tiny army in open battle, blows were
exchanged, casualties suffered, and the state of
warfare could only be concluded by a peace-
making ceremony.

Similarly, among the Australian aborig-
ines, who built no permanent dwellings but
wandered from water hole to water hole over
their almost desert country, warfare—and
rules of “international law”—were highly
developed. The student of social evolution will
seek in vain for his obvious causes of war,
struggle for lands, struggle for power of one
group over another, expansion of population,
need to divert the minds of a populace restive
under tyranny, or even the ambition of a suc-
cessful leader to enhance his own prestige. All
are absent, but warfare as a practice remained,
and men engaged in it and killed one another
in the course of a war because killing is what
is done in wars.

From instances like these it becomes
apparent that an inquiry into the causes of war
misses the fundamental point as completely as
does an insistence upon the biological neces-
sity of war. If a people have an idea of going
to war and the idea that war is the way in
which certain situations, defined within their
society, are to be handled, they will sometimes
go to war. If they are a mild and unaggressive
people, like the Sioux or the Bushmen, they may limit
themselves to defensive warfare, but they will
be forced to think in terms of war because
there are peoples near them who have warfare
as a pattern, and offensive, raiding, pillaging
warfare at that. When the pattern of warfare
is known, people like the Sioux or the Pueblo
Indians will defend themselves, taking advantage of their
natural defenses, the mesa village site, and
people like the Lepchas, having no natural
defenses and no idea of warfare, will merely
submit to the invader. But the essential point
remains the same. There is a way of behaving
which is known to a given people and labeled
as an appropriate form of behavior; a bold and
warlike people like the Siouxs or the Maoris may
label warfare as desirable as well as possible,
a mild people like the Pueblo Indians may
label warfare as undesirable, but to the minds
of both peoples the possibility of warfare is
present. Their thoughts, their hopes, their
plans are oriented about this idea—that war-
fare may be selected as the way to meet some
situation.

So simple peoples and civilized peoples,
mild peoples and violent, assertive peoples,
will all go to war if they have the invention,
just as those peoples who have the custom of
dueling will have duels and peoples who have
the pattern of vendetta will indulge in ven-
detta. And, conversely, peoples who do not
know of dueling will not fight duels, even
though their wives are seduced and their
daughters ravished; they may on occasion
commit murder but they will not fight duels.
Cultures which lack the idea of the vendetta
will not meet every quarrel in this way. A peo-
ple can use only the forms it has. So the Balo-
nese have their special way of dealing with a
quarrel between two individuals: if the two
feel that the causes of quarrel are heavy, they
may go and register their quarrel in the tem-
ple before the gods, and, making offerings,
they may swear never to have anything to do
with each other again... But in other soci-
eties, although individuals might feel as full of
animosity and as unwilling to have any fur-
ther contact as do the Balinese, they cannot
register their quarrel with the gods and go on
quietly about their business because registering quarrels with the gods is not an invention of which they know.

In many parts of the world, war is a game in which the individual can win counters—counters which bring him prestige in the eyes of his own sex or of the opposite sex; he plays for these counters as he might, in our society, strive for a tennis championship. Warfare is a frame for such prestige-seeking merely because it calls for the display of certain skills and certain virtues; all of these skills—riding straight, shooting straight, dodging the missiles of the enemy and sending one's own straight to the mark—can be equally well exercised in some other framework and, equally, the virtues—endurance, bravery, loyalty, steadfastness—can be displayed in other contexts. The tie-up between proving oneself a man and proving this by a success in organized killing is due to a definition which many societies have made of manliness. And often, even in those societies which counted success in warfare a proof of human worth, strange turns were given to the idea, as when the plains Indians gave their highest awards to the man who touched a live enemy rather than to the man who brought in a scalp—from a dead enemy—because the latter was less risky. Warfare is just an invention known to the majority of human societies by which they permit their young men either to accumulate prestige or avenge their honor or acquire loot or wives or slaves or sago lands or cattle or appease the blood lust of their gods or the restless souls of the recently dead. It is just an invention, older and more widespread than the jury system, but none the less an invention.

Grant that war is an invention, that it is not a biological necessity nor the outcome of certain special types of social forms, still, once the invention is made, what are we to do about it?... Warfare is here, as part of our thought; the deeds of warriors are immortalized in the words of our poets, the toys of our children are modeled upon the weapons of the soldier, the frame of reference within which our statesmen and our diplomats work always contains war. If we know that it is not inevitable, that it is due to historical accident that warfare is one of the ways in which we think of behaving, are we given any hope by that? What hope is there of persuading nations to abandon war, nations so thoroughly imbued with the idea that resort to war is, if not actually desirable and noble, at least inevitable whenever certain defined circumstances arise?

In answer to this question I think we might turn to the history of other social inventions, and inventions which must once have seemed as firmly entrenched as warfare. Take the methods of trial which preceded the jury system: ordeal and trial by combat. Unfair, capricious, alien as they are to our feeling today, they were once the only methods open to individuals accused of some offense. The invention of trial by jury gradually replaced these methods until only witches, and finally not even witches, had to resort to the ordeal... In each case the old method was replaced by a new social invention. The ordeal did not go out because people thought it unjust or wrong; it went out because a method more congruent with the institutions and feelings of the period was invented. And, if we despair over the way in which war seems such an ingrained habit of most of the human race, we can take comfort from the fact that a poor invention will usually give place to a better invention.

For this, two conditions, at least, are necessary. The people must recognize the defects of the old invention, and someone must make a new one. Propaganda against warfare, documentation of its terrible cost in human suffering and social waste, these prepare the ground by teaching people to feel that warfare is a defective social institution. There is further needed a belief that social invention is possible and the invention of new methods which will render warfare as out of date as the tractor is making the plow, or the motor car the horse and buggy. A form of behavior becomes out of date only when something else takes its place, and, in order to invent forms of behavior which will make war obsolete, it is a first requirement to believe that an invention is possible.